

## IV. РЕЦЕНЗИИ

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*FRIEDRICH-WILHELM VON HERRMANN*  
“HERMENEUTICS AND REFLECTION: HEIDEGGER AND  
HUSSLER ON THE CONCEPT OF PHENOMENOLOGY”

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The review provides an outline of the book and critically examines the Heideggerean hermeneutic phenomenological approach developed by F.-W. von Herrmann to the refutation of Husserl's phenomenology. Reviewer traces four essential differences in author's critical analysis of the two phenomenological approaches by Heidegger and Husserl, and problematizes several difficulties in the author's interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology. On the one hand, the reviewer shows that Husserl's phenomenology, at least, can be interpreted in two ways, namely the static approach and the genetic approach. Husserl's genetic phenomenology, especially in *Crisis*, explicitly expresses his hermeneutic character. Therefore, Herrmann's interpretation may not be faithful to Husserl's phenomenology as a whole. On the other hand, Herrmann develops Heidegger's idea of the primacy of a-reflective hermeneutics, which is a pre-theoretical primordial science. With reference to K. Popper's and K. Jaspers' criteria of science, the reviewer doubts that the development, which aims at going beyond reflective and theoretical science, can still be regarded as a science because it cannot meet any established criterion.

*Key words:* Husserl, Heidegger, von Herrmann, hermeneutics, phenomenology, reflection, a-phenomenology, givenness.

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*РЕЦЕНЗИЯ НА КНИГУ Ф.-В. ФОН ХЕРРМАННА*  
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В рецензии представлено основное содержание книги Ф.-В. фон Херрманна, а также критическое обсуждение герменевтически-феноменологического подхода Хайдеггера к опровержению феноменологии Э. Гуссерля, который был развит данным автором. Рецензент выделяет четыре существенных отличия в его критическом анализе двух феноменологических подходов — Гуссерля и Хайдеггера, проблематизируя при этом некоторые трудности в данной автором книги интерпретации феноменологии Гуссерля. С одной стороны, рецензент показывает, что феноменология Гуссерля, по меньшей мере, может интерпретироваться двояко: как статический подход и как генетический подход. Генетическая феноменология Гуссерля, особенно в его «Кризисе европейских наук», имеет выраженный герменевтический характер. Стало быть, данная фон Херрманном интерпретация не может быть верной относительно феноменологии Гуссерля в целом. С другой стороны, фон Херрманн развивает хайдеггеровскую идею о приоритете нерелективной герменевтики, которая является примордиальной до-теоретической наукой. Опираясь на критерии научности, выдвинутые К. Поппером и К. Ясперсом, рецензент подвергает сомнению, что то расширение феноменологии, которое претендует на выход за пределы рефлективной и теоретической науки, все еще может считаться наукой, поскольку оно не соответствует ни одному из установленных критериев.

*Ключевые слова:* Гуссерль, Хайдеггер, фон Херрманн, герменевтика, феноменология, рефлексия, а-феноменология, данность.

It is problematic to simply understand Heidegger's thought as hermeneutics without taking into the consideration of his hermeneutic project in the development of the phenomenological movement. Friderich-Wilhelm von Herrmann provides a detailed analysis of it.

The first chapter addresses that the conceptions of phenomenology are different in Husserl and Heidegger. Husserl's phenomenology insists the importance of theoretical science and methodological procedure, but Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology projects an alternative, namely a pre-theoretical primordial science of the domain of pre-theoretical life and experience. This science is not of a theoretical nature, but rather an a-theoretical one.

The second chapter elaborates that the things themselves are the given correlated to the consciousness in Husserl's phenomenology, but they are self-giving of the things in Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology. The former pays attention to the description of the objectified things. On the contrary, the latter pays attention to the experience of the non-objectified things or the being of the beings themselves.

The third chapter indicates that Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology is primordial than Husserl's phenomenology, as the domain of pre-theoretical life and experience is the ground for any theoretical science. Without pre-reflective level of life, there could be no reflective phenomenology or reflective science.

Throughout the three chapters, Herrmann employs Heidegger's deciding question in *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie* as his central theme: "Is this method of reflective description or describing reflection capable of investigating the domain of lived-experience, of disclosing it scientifically?" (Herrmann, 2013, 76). Herrmann's answer is negative. The reflective character in Husserl's phenomenology marks its limitation towards the question raised by Heidegger's investigation of ontological research. His argument is based upon four differences between the two thinkers. In addition, all differences connect with their different understandings of the phenomenological maxim, "to the things themselves".

The first difference is the doctrine of method. It relates to the maxim that how we can go "to" the things themselves? The fundamental method in Husserl is *epoche* and *reduction*, in which "I retrieve myself from the naïve act-enactment and reflect on the life of the act itself" (Herrmann, 2013, 131). However, those in Heidegger are *reduction*, *construction* and *destruction*. The first method secures the opening of analysis. The second secures the access to the being-phenomenon. The third secures the passage through the reign occlusions. The three basic parts provide a fruitful path towards his investigation of the being of beings (Herrmann, 2013, 130–131). It is true that both speak of a *reduction*, but Herrmann pinpoints the different meanings of *reduction* between them. For Husserl, *reduction* is a reflective holding "back to" the life of consciousness over against the natural-naïve positing of present-at-handness. For Heidegger, *reduction* is a method of revealing "into" the being of beings. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger discloses the being of beings as self-showing-in-itself that "I myself always am, as the self-related ecstatic disclosure of my existence and the existentials that form my existence" (Herrmann, 2013, 133). The two different meanings of *reduction* express two different ways "to" the things themselves. The first difference leads to the second difference.

The second difference is the doctrine of intuition. Husserl's way of seeing is to "stand over against or outside what is seen" (Herrmann, 2013, 87). It has a reflective and objectifying character keeping outside what is to be experienced. Heidegger's way of seeing is to "stand within what is seen" (Herrmann, 2013, 87). It has an appropriating character which is sympathy with itself in living experience. Through the different meaning of *reduction*, their ways of seeing are different. The former embraces the primordial intention, untouched by the theoretical. The latter grows intensification towards the pre-theoretical manner with living-experience itself, which is the primordial intention. The different way of seeing leads to the third difference, that is, the difference of what-is-seen.

The third difference is the given. Husserl believes what-is-seen in reflection is given, which is immediate and corporeal givenness of the perceptual thing for the perceiving experience (Herrmann, 2013, 56). Nevertheless, Heidegger rejects this claim because what-is-seen in reflection is not primordial. What-is-seen is primordially lived-experience. The lived experience is alive and present to the experiencing in its significance but not given. Thus, Heidegger could claim that what-is-seen in the a-theoretical self-showing is primordial comparing to what-is-seen in the theoretical reflection. Moreover, "givenness is a theoretical form distinct from the way of encountering that designates the a-theoretical self-showing of what is significant as surrounding world when we experience and deal with it" (Herrmann, 2013, 57).

The fourth difference is the aliveness or livingness. The aliveness or livingness marks the most important difference as it refers to the different being-character of beings. Herrmann points out that the key in Husserl is *Vorgang* (passing by) but that in Heidegger is *Ereignis* (happening). The former refers to the reflectively objectified lived-experience, whereas the latter refers to the primary and fundamental lived-experience (Herrmann, 2013, 46). The reflective character in Husserl's phenomenology, in Herrmann's view, is a must because Husserl's understanding of "making present" as reflective objectification means "bringing to consciousness in reflection" (Herrmann, 2013, 30). Husserl's reflective phenomenology draws a certain distance to objectify and observe the lived-experience. Thus, this theoretical attitude of phenomenological reflection "withdraws from the pre-theoretical living-experience of the pre-theoretical aliveness that is owing to it" (Herrmann, 2013, 77). Conversely, Heidegger's understanding of "making present" means bringing to present non-reflectively as what is present stays with the living, enacted lived experience. Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology pays attention to "the

non-reflective living-experience [Erleben], which we undergo [*durchleben*] in one with the experienced” (Herrmann, 2013, 76). For hermeneutic interpretation, “the lived-experiences manifest as happening [*Er-eignisse*], the self-temporalizing experience that lives from within its own” (Herrmann, 2013, 73).

All these differences can be explained through an example illustrated by Herrmann. When we see the brown color, what do Husserl and Heidegger understand by seeing the brown color? For Husserl, the brown color is the pure subjective sensation of brown in perception. Besides, it is a moment to psychic process. What is seen is a material aspect or sense quality. For Heidegger, the brown color is an integrated meaning connection with something, e.g. lectern. It is not a mere physical thing, but is full of significance in the surrounding world (Herrmann, 2013, 51).

With respect to the four differences, Herrmann argues that the reductively opened absolute being of consciousness “is not the genuine way of being of the subject” and “closes off from the possibility of revealing of its existential constitution and self-related ecstatic” (Herrmann, 2013, 134). The reflective approach could only treat what-is-seen as a mere thing in a theoretical attitude. What is the meaning of “mere thing”? The thing does not show itself, it is hidden, over against the being that show themselves outside-science and in positive science. The “mere thing” character “takes place as designifying, stripping of life and de-historicizing” (Herrmann, 2013, 61). It withdraws “the livingness of the living-experience” (Herrmann, 2013, 61). It is the reason why Husserl’s method of reflective description is not capable of investigating the domain of lived-experience, of disclosing it scientifically. Moreover, Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology, unlike Husserl, turns “into” the being in the sense that I understand myself in my being. It is what he calls “self-showing”. It is the being of the subject, namely existence. To avoid the closeness, Heidegger pays attention not to treat what-is-seen as a mere thing. He draws an important distinction, namely the ontological difference. This distinction shows that “the being of beings is not itself being” (Herrmann, 2013, 122). It means that my ontic self-comportment is previously illuminated through my understanding of my own being as existence. Herrmann emphasizes that hermeneutic understanding is not to encounter things of sense experience, but rather meaning things in the surrounding world. The surrounding world does not mean “a whole of things or objects — but a whole of significances” (Herrmann, 2013, 37), which is not mediated by or through a world of perception. Hermeneutics looking into the lived experience of the surrounding world is not objectifying, not positing of thing and consciousness

of givenness, and not sensory perceiving of a thing given as a body. Instead, it is the seeing understanding of what is significant (Herrmann, 2013, 66). As a result, hermeneutic understanding could merge the break between the experiencing and the experienced. It forms a unifying onefold in the living-experience. What is seen “is only meant in cognizing but not objectified” (Herrmann, 2013, 67). In this sense, hermeneutic phenomenology is “a way of encountering in the mode of self-showing-in-itself. It directly reveals and shows itself” (Herrmann, 2013, 114).

The fundamental difference between Husserl’s reflective phenomenology and Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology is that the former is based upon the theoretical or phenomenal attitude and treats lived-experience as reflected, whereas the latter is based upon the pre-theoretical or a-theoretical attitude and aims at showing or manifesting lived-experience as what they are primordially. However, the difference does not mean phenomenology is “either Husserl or Heidegger”. Both follow the fundamental maxim in phenomenology, namely ‘to the things themselves’. Other than these, the maxim does not restrict a pathway only. “The maxim...is not bound to the reflective approach...can also guide a philosophizing that is pre-reflective and pre-theoretical” (Herrmann, 2013, 24). Thus, it is necessary to understand the limitation of reflective phenomenology in order to have a faithful understanding of Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology in the context of phenomenological development.

Overall, Herrmann’s argument is clear, but it is debatable whether it is a sound argument because of two reasons. Firstly, Herrmann’s interpretation merely focuses on Husserl’s text in the period of static phenomenology, especially *Ideen I*. The hermeneutic character in *Krisis* is ignored. Secondly, if we read „Randbemerkungen Husserls zu Heideggers *Sein und Zeit* und *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*”, then we would find the distinction between the two thinkers may not be that clear. From 1893–1934, Husserl continues to work on the domain of time-consciousness and its being-character. Perhaps, in *History of the Concept of Time*, Heidegger offers a gentle reminder for our interpretation between the two thinkers: “...its characteristic of Husserl that his questioning is still full in flux, so that we must in the final analysis be cautious in our critique” (Herrmann, 2013, 121). More importantly, some followers might argue that Heidegger does not aim at arguing against Husserl as a whole, but only an idealistic interpretation of Husserl, through which is theoretical and reflective-laden. If it is the case, the above challenge can be solved. Nevertheless, his argument is invalid because of a fatal mistake. According to

Herrmann, Heidegger seeks for a pre-theoretical primordial science of the domain of pre-theoretical life and experience, which has an a-theoretical nature.

I shall doubt whether a science can be without a-theoretical nature. Karl Popper, in *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (Popper, 2002), points out five essential features of science: (1) theoretical systems with universality; (2) methodological rules with falsifiability; (3) empirical basis with objectivity; (4) degree of testability with probability and (5) simplicity. Although his criteria are mainly for natural science, it is arguably that some of them can be applied to human science or social science. Karl Jaspers, in *General Psychopathology*, argues that if we use different methods, then object and scientific meaning change. "Science assumes an extraordinary number of different forms" (Jaspers, 1963, 768). Science is an attitude rather than a specific discipline. The scientific attitude is to ask for general validity, convincing insights (which can be proved), clarity of method and the possibility for a meaningful discussion. As a result, the universality of theoretical system is culturally or socially limited, but science must provide a theoretical system. If (1) is dismissed, would Herrmann and Heidegger accept (2), (3), (4) and (5). Precisely, how could "pre-theoretical primordial science" still be regarded as a science?

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